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Economic Sanctions and Trade Regulation*
Michael P. Malloy**
This article seeks to determine whether US economic sanctions can be
maintained consistently with the obligations of the international trade regime. In
Part I, it will consider the extent to which the current prevalence of economic
sanctions may create tension with international trading rules. In Part II, the
article will assess arguments that sanctions are inconsistent with applicable
principles of customary international law. Part III will consider whether
sanctions are inconsistent with international trading regimes and consequently
are impermissible. In Part IV, the article concludes that while sanctions are
legally permissible in the face of indeterminate legal obligations and international
trading rules, imposition of sanctions may nevertheless have adverse
consequences for a sanctioning state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions have become an increasingly prevalent feature of US
international economic and foreign policy.' The general impermissibility of the
use or threat of armed force has to some degree increased the relative
importance of economic sanctions, a form of economic warfare. This is not
necessarily a fortuitous development. The less obvious costs of economic
sanctions, 2 as compared to those of armed force, may encourage a facile resort
to economic sanctions that would have been intolerable in the case of armed

Copyright © 2003 Michael P. Malloy. Portions of this article are drawn from the author's
forthcoming casebook, John H. Barton, Bart S. Fisher, and Michael P. Malloy, International
Trade and Investment (Kluwer Law International 2d ed).
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See Michael P. Malloy, United States Economic Sanctions: Theory and Practice31-142 (Kluwer Law
International 2001) (discussing historical developments with respect to US sanctions policy).
For a suggestive economic analysis of costs of economic sanctions, see Thomas 0. Bayard,
Joseph Pelzman, and Jorge Perez-Lopez, Stakes and Risks in Economic Sanctions, 6 World
Economy 73 (1983).
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force. We may see something of this result in the increased frequency of use of
economic sanctions in US practice over the past twenty years.'
Understanding the place of economic sanctions within the institutions of
international trade can be a complicated undertaking for several reasons. First,
while "economic sanctions" may have intuitive meaning as a descriptive term,
there is continuing scholarly debate over the technical scope of the term.4
Second, "emergency" sanctions, when continued over a long period of years
(such as is the case with sanctions against Cuba), may be assimilated into
"normal" trade and foreign policy. Third, sanctions often blur into ordinary
trade penalties in ways that make it difficult to distinguish between the two. For
example, ordinary penalties available for violations of settled trade policy may
reach such critical proportions that they metamorphose into aggressive sanctions
in a burgeoning "trade war."' Similar problems exist when we consider the
denial of favorable or preferential trade treatment-itself a feature of trade
policy-on the basis of criteria other than those appurtenant to that policy.
Thus, economic sanctions may be viewed as occurring within a spectrum in
which related governmental actions may blend into "sanctions" at their outer
edges.
In some situations, we may be able to differentiate sanctions from ordinary
trade policy in terms of their respective policy objectives. However,
consideration of these contrasting policies may actually underscore the tension
inherent in the relationship between economic sanctions and US trade policy.
Typically, economic sanctions are effective to the extent that they frustrate the
normal expectations of the trade and financial systems. Thus, in a narrow sense,
economic sanctions are not a part of US trade policy and are antithetical to the
basic rubrics of that policy.6 The imposition of economic sanctions does not, in

4

See, for example, Malloy, United States Economic Sanctions at 35 (cited in note 1) (noting
increase in sanctions programs). See also id, Figure 2.1 (providing graphic presentation of
historical progression).
See id at 10-11 (contrasting differing definitions of the term). In the vocabulary of public
international law, the term "countermeasure" is often used as the preferred term when
referring to economic sanctions. See, for example, United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in
Tebran (US v Iran), 1980 ICJ 3, 27 (May 24) (using term "countermeasure"). See generally
Omer Yousif Elagab, The Legaliy of Non-Forible Counter-Measures in International Law 3-4
(Oxford 1988) (discussing terminology).
See, for example, Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 McGeorge L Rev 839 (2000) (analyzing
trade war over bananas between United States and European Union); Derek Devgun,

InternationalFiscal Warsfor the Tweno-First Centuy: An Assessment of Tax-Based Trade Retaliation,

6

27 L & Poly in Intl Bus 353 (1996) (analyzing "tax wars" resulting from international friction
between allies).
For example, in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Congress made a
specific finding that "there has arisen a new global economy in which trade, technological
development, investment, and services form an integrated system[,] and in this system these
activities
affect each other and the health of the United States economy." Pub L No 100-418,
§ 1001(a)(1), 102 Stat 1107, 1120, codified at 19 USC 5 2901 note (2000). In ight of this
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the short term, reinforce stability in external trade. As a prima facie matter, then,
the use of economic sanctions creates tension within international trade regimes.
II. POSSIBLE INCONSISTENCIES WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY
Customary and even conventional principles of public international law
have not had any readily discernible, practical effect on US practice with respect
to economic sanctions. In part this may be due to the apparent indeterminacy of
international law in this regard. Typical of the indeterminate nature of the
principles invoked is the recent attempt by Marc Bossuyt to construct a set of
limitations on the use of sanctions under international law.' Commissioned by
the UN Economic and Social Council, his working paper concludes that
economic sanctions are often ineffective and illegal, but it relies on vague
authority and questionable assumptions in reaching this sweeping conclusion.
Bossuyt advances legal arguments based exclusively on aspirational or hortatory
language derived from selective passages of the UN Charter, General Assembly
resolutions, and pronouncements of humanitarian organizations.8 His
assumptions about economic sanctions theory and practice are at best skewed,9

7

8

situation, Congress found it to be essential "to ensure future stability in external trade of the
United States." Id § 1001 (a)(4)(B).
Marc Bossuyt, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Commission on
Human Rights, Economic and Social Council Working Paper No E/CN4/Sub.2/2000/33
aune 2000).
See, for example, id at 8 (discussing legal limitations "implied" by UN Charter art 1); id at
10-11 (invoking humanitarian sources). But see Tom J. Farer, Politicaland Economic Coercion in
ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 79 Am J Intl L 405 (1985).
See, for example, Bossuyt, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions at 13 (cited in note 7)
(asserting incorrectly that sole basis for sanctions is "that economic pressure on civilians will
translate into pressure on the [target] Government for change"). In fact, the basis and
objectives of sanctions are varied and multi-directional. See Malloy, United States Economic
Sanctions at 18-20 (cited in note 1):
In general, it has been said that economic sanctions "are an instrument
of economic policy designed to serve several, not necessarily mutually
exclusive, foreign policy, military or strategic objectives."
' ' * [O]ne generic policy objective behind economic sanctions can be
said to be "directive": to create economic pressure calculated to alter behavior
of a target state. Another generic policy objective may be termed "defensive":
in the trade embargo context, for example, this might be expressed as an
objective "to reduce or slow development of an adversary's military or
strategic capabilities by raising the economic cost of acquiring imports or
import substitutes."
...Other objectives may be more impressionistic and hence less susceptible to
measurement. One such generic category that is often cited may be termed
"communicative": in this sense, sanctions may be imposed "to send a symbolic
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and his factual assertions are often dubious.1 ° Thus, this approach amounts to
little more than a disingenuous polemic providing scant guidance for analysis of
the legality of sanctions under international law.
B. CONCEPT OF NONFORCIBLE COUNTERMEASURE
Arguably, the concept of "nonforcible countermeasure'" may provide a
more useful analysis. Viewed as a nonforcible countermeasure, an economic
sanction-and particularly a unilateral sanction-may be evaluated as state
action invoked in response to the actions of another state, permissible only in
situations in which the target state has breached some obligation or duty owed
to the invoking state. Under this principle, there should first be a demand for
redress by the invoking state and a refusal of the demand on the part of the
target state, prior to the invocation of countermeasures. 2 In addition, the
countermeasure invoked should be proportional to the violation or breach
suffered.'
There are two difficulties with this approach to the analysis of economic
sanctions. First, it is not evident what customary principle of public international
law requires a countermeasure justification when a state decides to interdict
commercial or financial intercourse with another state. That there is such a
customay principle (that is, aside from any conventional obligations of the invoking

10

11

12

13

message of displeasure with another country's behaviour (which may also be
for internal political purposes or directed at allies)."
(Footnotes omitted). Another "end game" objective of sanctions may be "to retain a pool of
blocked assets, or an array of other economic sanctions, as 'bargaining chips' for any future
negotiations with the target country in resolution of the broader directive or defensive policy
objectives." Id at 29.
See, for example, Bossuyt, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions at 18-19 (cited in note
7) (accepting argument that purpose of Iraqi sanctions is "deliberate infliction on the Iraqi
people" of life-threatening conditions). Bossuyt naively ignores clear evidence of the
responsibility of the Iraqi Government for then current living conditions in Iraq. See, for
example, Barbara Crossette, Iraq Won't Let Outside Experts Assess Sanctions' Impact on Lives, NY
Times Al (Sept 12, 2000) (detailing effect of Iraqi Government policies on availability of
humanitarian relieo.
See Elagab, Non-Forcible Counter-Measuresat 47-51 (cited in note 4). See also Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 5 905(1) (1987) (concerning resort
to unilateral countermeasures in response to violation of international obligation by another
state).
See Elagab, Non-Forcible Counter-Measures at 64-65, 77-79 (cited in note 4). See also
Restatement § 905(l)(a) (cited in note 11) (countermeasure necessary to terminate, prevent or
remedy violation); id, comment c ("necessity" as when accused state denies violation or its
responsibility therefor, and rejects or ignores requests).
See Elagab, Non-Forcible Counter-Measures at 83-86 (cited in note 4). See also Restatement
§ 905(1)(b); id, reporters' note 5 (discussing proportionality). In a different but comparable
context, the American Law Institute has taken the position, for example, that the exercise of
jurisdiction, otherwise legal, with extraterritorial effect should not be "unreasonable." See id
at § 403(1).
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state in favor of the target state) is often tacitly assumed but rarely discussed in
the secondary literature. Analysis of the actual practice of states throughout the
last century suggests that the prevalence of sanctions is not constrained by such
14
a norm.
Second, even accepting arguendo that such a customary principle exists, a
difficulty remains in identifying situations, particularly retrospectively, in which a
state has imposed sanctions in violation of this principle. States normally
construct at least a colorable justification for the imposition5 of sanctions.
Independent and definitive assessment of sanctions is infrequent.'
C. SPECIALIZED ISSUES
Other, more specialized issues about economic sanctions are frequently
raised. These include such questions as the legality of secondary boycotts and
the permissibility of extraterritorial application of sanctions. 6 The two issues are
often intertwined.
1. Secondary Boycotts
A boycott is a systematic refusal to deal with a business enterprise because
of an action or position it has taken; it may be a privately organized effort or a
government-sponsored or government-mandated program. A secondag boycott is
a boycott directed at a third party for its dealing with the primary target of a
boycott. The long-standing official US policy is to oppose the use of secondary
boycotts, particularly against US allies and trading partners. 17 Anti-boycott rules
are sometimes employed in an attempt to neutralize the effects of a primary or
secondary boycott. However, the United States itself in recent years has imposed
secondary boycotts in a number of situations, which naturally throws into doubt
14

See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions 5 n 6 (1988) ("The frequent use of

15

[economic] sanctions by the United States and many other countries constitutes persuasive
evidence that no clear norm exists against them in customary international law."). See also
Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and U.S. Trade § 10.3.1 and Figure 10.1 at 593-607
(Little, Brown 1990) (analyzing customary practice of states); Malloy, United States Economic
Sanctions § 5.2.2 and Figure 3.3 at 306-14 (cited in note 1) (updating analysis).
But compare Militay and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v US), 1986 ICJ 14, 127 (June 27)

16

(holding unjustifiable the countermeasures, including use of force, taken by the United States
against Nicaragua).
On secondary boycotts, see generally David J. Santeusanio, Extraterritorialiyand Secondagy

17

Boycotts: A Criticaland Legal Analysis of United States Foreign Poliy, 21 Suffolk Transnad L Rev
367 (1998); Joseph V. Walker, The Legalioy of the Secondary Boycotts Containedin the Helms-Burton
Act under InternationalLaw, 3 DePaul Dig Intl L 1 (1997). On extraterritorial application of
sanctions generally, see Richard W. Edwards, Jr., ExtrateritorialApplicationof the U.S. Iranian
Assets Control Regulaions, 75 Am J Intl L 870 (1981); Santeusanio, 21 Suffolk Transnad L Rev
367 (cited above).
See, for example, 50 USC app § 2402(5)(A)-(B) (2000) (congressional declaration of policy
under Export Administration Act of condemning boycotts).
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the credibility of the US policy. Such situations include the application of
traditional asset blocking programs like the Foreign Assets Control Regulations
("FACRs") to the assets of any person acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of North Korea or any national thereof, and any other person determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a designated national. 8 These sanctions
also frequently have extraterritorial effects, since the affected "nationals" may in
fact be individuals or companies that are citizens or nationals of third countries,
subjected to sanctions essentially because they are or have been dealing with
North Korea or its nationals.
There is, however, an important distinction to be maintained between the
broadened sanctions against such nationals and a traditional secondary boycott.
In a secondary boycott, the secondary target is being sanctioned directly for
dealing with the primary target, even though such dealings have no jurisdictional
relationship to the sanctioning state. However, in the case of the FACRs, the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACRs"),"9 and many other US programs
using similar concepts," the "specially designated national" is sanctioned to the
extent the person is or has been acting "for or on behalf of the Government or
authorities exercising control over any designated foreign country," 21 and then
only to the extent the prohibited transaction also involves property or a person
subject to US jurisdiction." In this sense, one could argue, such a person's
exposure to sanctions is not secondary, but vicarious.
This justification would fail to explain the blatantly secondary effects of the
controversial episode known as the gas pipeline incident of 1981-82.23 US
sanctions in response to the declaration of martial law in Poland included
extraterritorial sanctions against the construction of the Yamal pipeline,
attempting to bar European firms from using previously licensed US technology
in the production and sale of equipment for the pipeline project. 24 The sole
jurisdictional basis for the extraterritorial effect of those sanctions was the US
origin of technology already legitimately in the control of non-US nationals.
The pipeline sanctions were, as a practical matter, unenforceable and are
generally judged to have been a failure.25 Yet since then, the United States has
18
19
20
21

See 31 CFR

§

500 (2000) for FACRs generally. See also id

§ 500.306(a)(1)

(providing for

Secretary's determination that a person is a "specially designated national").
Id § 515.
See, for example, the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, id § 550.304.
Id § 500.306(a)(2) (FACRs definition of "specially designated national"). See also id §

24

515.306(a)(2) (corresponding CACRs provision).
See, for example, id §§ 500.201(a)(1), (b)(1)-(2), 515.201 (a)(1), (b)(1)-(2).
See Homer Moyer and Linda Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Poliy: The History,
Legal Issues, and Polig Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 L & Poly in Ind Bus 1, 60-92 (1983).
See 15 CFR § 390 (1982) (establishing Commerce Department controls, effective Dec 30,

25

1981).
See Moyer and Mabry, Export Controls (cited in note 23).

22
23

Vol. 4 No. 2

MaI q

Oa est votre chapeau? Economic Sanctions and Trade Regulation

mandate-imposed
to
congressional
pursuant
occasionally-usually
questionable secondary sanctions with broad extraterritorial reach.26
2. Extraterritorial Applicability of Sanctions
The extraterritorial implications of US economic sanctions programs have
been a continuing source of controversy and vexation. The problem is
particularly acute for US-based multinational enterprises, which often find
themselves caught in the middle of conflicts of public policy between a sanctions
mandate of the United States and the hostility to sanctions exhibited by the host
governments and courts of their off-shore establishments. In private litigation in
host jurisdictions, US multinational enterprises may find themselves in a
defensive posture, serving as proxies for the US government in attempting to
uphold the validity of US sanctions.27 In US jurisprudence, there are no
meaningful legal limits to the extraterritorial application of economic sanctions.28
Nevertheless, several recent economic sanctions programs have evidenced some
hesitancy in applying prohibitions extraterritorially, though this forbearance has
sometimes been achieved by licensing certain categories of transactions out from

26

See, for example, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ("Helms-Burton Act"), Pub

27

L No 104-114, Mar 12, 1996, 109 Stat 826 (1996), codified at scattered sections of 22 USC
(2000) (targeting third-country nationals that trade with Cuba, with broad extraterritorial
implications); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-172, 110 Stat 1541 (1996)
(hereinafter ILSA), as amended by ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub L No 107-24,115 Stat
199 (2001), to be codified at 50 USC § 1701 (imposing economic sanctions on third-country
persons engaging in specified transactions with Iran or Libya). The Helms-Burton Act has
prompted extensive critical commentary by scholars. See, for example, S. Kern Alexander,
Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban Propery: Lender Liabilioy under the Helms-Burton Act and Customagy
International Law, 16 Dickinson J Intl L 523 (1998); Stephen V. Iglesias, The Legality of the
Helms-Burton Act under NAFTA: An Analysis of the Auments the United States, Canada, and
Mexico May Present to a Chapter 20 Dispute Resolution Panel, 3 Spg NAFTA: L & Bus Rev Am
116 (1997); Walker, 3 DePaul Dig Intl L 1 (cited in note 16); Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, HelmsBurton Invites a CloserLook at Counter-Measures,30 Geo Wash J Intl L & Econ 317 (1996-97).
See, for example, FruehaufCorp v Massardy, Cours D'Appel Paris, May 22, 1965, Gaz Pal 1965,

28

2, 86 (France), note translated in 5 ILM 476 (1966) (involving US-based firm defending US
sanctions against China); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Company, 1 Lloyd's L Rep
259 (QB 1987) (UK) (involving US-based bank defending blocking of off-shore Libyan
deposits); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v ManufacturersHanover Trust Co., 2 Lloyd's L Rep 494 (QB
1988) (UK). See generally Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of America, 749 F2d 1378 (9th Cir
1984) (adopting seven-factor analysis of jurisdictional assertion); Trugman-Nash, Inc v New
ZealandDaigy Board,954 F Supp 733, 736-37 (SDNY 1997) (citing Timberlane).
See, for example, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
403(1) (jurisdiction not to be exercised where exercise is "unreasonable"), 414 (exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign branches and subsidiaries) (1987). For a vigorous critique of the
Third Restatement's approach to the legality of extraterritoriality, see Kathleen Hixson,
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction underthe Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12
Fordham Int LJ 127 (1988).
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the impact of the prohibitory provisions, rather than by exempting them from
coverage. 29
III. WTO CONSISTENCY
A. PRIMA FACIE CHALLENGES
Given the uncertainty of analysis under general principles of customary
international law, it is natural that attention should be turning increasingly to the
consistency of US economic sanctions under conventional obligations, such as
the Charter of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF Charter") or the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").3 ° Thus, certain forms of unilateral trade sanctions imposed by one
WTO member state on another member state arguably constitute prima facie
violations of the GATT.3 Similar analysis would apply under the IMF Charter in32
the case of unilateral financial sanctions involving currency restrictions.

29

See, for example, 44 Fed Reg 65956 (1979), codified at 31 CFR § 535.901 (authorizing

31

withdrawals or other transfers from any account held by US bank in name of non-Iranian
bank located in foreign country under specified circumstances).
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and Articles of Agreement of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 64 Star 1401, TIAS No 1501, 2
UN Treaty Ser 39 (1945), as amended (hereinafter IMF Charter); General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, GATT BISD 39 (1969), 61 Star pts 5, 6, TIAS No 1700 at 639, 55 UN
Treaty Ser 194 (1950), as amended (hereinafter GATT). For analysis of US economic
sanctions under WTO obligations, see, for example, Riyaz Dattu and John Boscariol, GA7T
Article XXI, Helms-Burton and the Continuing Abuse of the NationalSecurity Exception, 28 Can Bus
L J 198, 202-03 (1997); Alexander, 16 Dickinson J Intl L 523 (cited in note 26); Dapo
Akande and Sope Williams, InternationalAdjudication on NationalSecurity Issues: What Rolefor the
U7TO?, 43 Va J Intl L 365 (2003).
It cannot be seriously contended that multilateral sanctions mandated by the UN Security

32

Council are limited by WTO obligations. See GATT art XXI § (c) (cited in note 30):
"Nothing in [the GATI] shall be construed .. .to prevent any contracting party from taking
any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security."
See, for example, IMF Charter art VIII, § 2(a). See generally C.H. de Pardieu, The Carter

30

Freeze: Spedfic Problems Relating to the InternationalMonetagy Fund, 9 Intl Bus Law 97 (1981). No
explicit exception exists comparable to the GATT or GATS national security exceptions. See
Richard W. Edwards, Jr., International Monetary Collaboration 415-20 (Transnational 1985)
(discussing national security restrictions in IMF practice). However, a 1952 decision of the
IMF Executive Board established a procedure for the granting of IMF approval of
restrictions imposed on security grounds. IMF Executive Board Decision No 144 (52/51)
(Aug 14, 1952), reprinted in IMF Selected Decisions 235 (IMF 10th ed 1983). The impetus for
this decision was, among other things, US imposition of economic sanctions against the
People's Republic of China in December 1950. Edwards, InternationalMonetaryCollaborationat
415 n 159 (cited above). The procedure has been invoked in a variety of situations, including,
for example, the imposition of US sanctions against Iran in connection with the hostage
crisis of 1979-1981. See id at 416. See also Edwards, 75 AmJ Intl L at 873-76 (cited in note
16) (discussing IMF procedures); de Pardieu, 9 Intl Bus Law at 99 (cited above).
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Regional arrangements may also forbid the use of coercive measures, short of
force, intended to "force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from it
advantages of any kind."33
Focusing on the GATT, a member state that is the primary or secondary
target of unilateral sanctions could challenge the WTO consistency of the
sanctions on several grounds: that sanctions constitute a
denial of most-favorednation ("MFN") treatment,3 4 since other member states' goods are not so
affected; that they constitute a failure to apply GATT tariff bindings to the
importation of such goods;3 5 that sanctions involve a denial of national
treatment," since goods and other assets of the target state are subject to
restrictions not applicable to other goods and assets within the jurisdiction of
sanctioning state; or, that sanctions are an impermissible imposition of a nontariff barrier to trade.3 7 While these challenges may be subject to a defense based
on a national security exception," a target state would also have available to it
the nullification and impairment provisions of the GATT, which do not
necessarily depend upon proof of a violation of the GATT by the sanctioning
39
state.

B. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
Arrangements under conventional law do not appear to have presented any
significant practical impediments to the implementation of US economic
sanctions policies. The GATT contains a self-judging national security exception
that arguably covers the matter. ° There are a number of instances in which

34
35

Charter of the Organization of American States art 19, 2 UST 2394, TIAS No 2361 (1948)
(hereinafter OAS Charter). Of course, economic sanctions properly invoked in accordance
with the rubrics of customary international law concerning nonforcible countermeasures
would not in principle violate this provision of the OAS Charter.
GATT art I (cited in note 30).
Id art II,§ 1(a).

36

Id art III.

33

37

Id art XI.

38

Id art XXI.

39

Id art XXII, § l(b)-(c). These provisions allow for GA'IT-consistent countermeasures
against a sanctioning state where the target state:
should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under [the
GATT] is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
[the GATI] is being impeded as the result of...
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure whether or not it

conflicts with theprovisions of this Agreement, or

40

(c) the existence of any other situation ....
(emphasis added).
See id art XXI, § (b)(iii). For an excellent review of the application and implications of the
GATT for US economic sanctions practice, see Carter, InternationalEconomic Sanctionsat 5 n 6
(cited in note 14), id at 95-98 (referring to export controls); id at 131-40 (referring to import
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GATT contracting parties have invoked the national security exception as a selfjudging justification for the imposition of sanctions that might otherwise be
viewed as GATT-inconsistent." With the establishment of the WTO in 1994
after the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT multilateral
4
trade negotiations, 42 the WTO Agreement continued the GATT in force,43
including the national security exception of Article XXI.
The Uruguay Round also finalized the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS").4 The GATS establishes "a multilateral framework of
principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such
trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization, ' 45 by
applying GATT non-discrimination principles to trade in services.46 The GATS
specifically applies to financial services. Under the GATS, each WTO member
is required to accord MFN treatment to services and service suppliers of other
WTO members.48 Current restrictions on trade in services of each member must
be transparent.49 Members are also required to administer current restrictions "in
a reasonable, objective and impartial manner."' The requirements of nondiscriminatory treatment do not, however, prevent WTO member states from
enforcing domestic regulations for "prudential reasons, including for the
protection of... [depositors] or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a

41

42

43
44
45
46

47
48
49
50

controls). Akande and Williams make an elegant series of arguments for the proposition that
GAI Article XXI should not be considered "entirely self-judging." Akande and Williams,
43 Va J Intl L at 381-402 (cited in note 30). However, their arguments ultimately rest on
their initial observation that "a self-judging obligation is not a legal obligation at all," which is
an apodictic proposition but nevertheless a mischaracterization of Article XXI. By its own
terms, Article XXI expresses a rule of construction, not an obligation. See below, text and
accompanying note 68.
See, for example, Dattu and Boscariol, 28 Can Bus L J at 204-05 (cited in note 30)
(discussing 1961 Ghanaian boycott of Portuguese goods, 1975 Swedish global import quota
system for footwear, 1985 US embargo of Nicaragua).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec 15, 1993, art I,
reprinted in 33 ILM 13 (1994) (hereinafter WTO Agreement).
Id at Annex 1A (incorporating GATT 1947).
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 Apr 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, 33 ILM
1167 (1994) (hereinafter GATS).
Id at preamble.
See, for example, id art II, § 1 (applying most-favored-nation treatment to services and
service suppliers); id art XVII, § 1 (applying national treatment to services and service
suppliers of other WTO member states).
Id at Annex on Financial Services.
Id art II, § 1.
See id art III (requiring publication and reporting of restrictive measures).
Id art VI, § 1. Compare id art X, § 1 (requiring that any emergency safeguard measures be
administered in a non-discriminatory manner).
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financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial
•
system." 5'
A series of general exceptions applies to GATS obligations, similar to the
general exceptions under the GATT. 2 More importantly for present purposes,
the GATS includes a self-judging special exception for essential security interests
of member states, similar to the special security exception contained in the
GATT. 3 Presumably, this exception would shield US economic sanctions
imposing financial restrictions from the requirements and strictures of the
GATS.
Many academic critics have argued that the national security exception has
been abused by the United States, particularly as a justification for long-standing
sanctions like the Cuban embargo. 4 Note, however, that Article XXI makes the
decision to employ sanctions on the basis of national security a decision for the
invoking state, not for the WTO-nor even for academics. The fact that debate
continues to swirl around the national security exception may simply be an
indication of differences in geopolitical styles, rather than substantive legal
concerns. As one commentator has noted:
While the Europeans may believe the United States is "too quick to
pull the sanctions trigger," .... Americans believe that too often the United
States "takes the heat for dealing with difficult issues while others take the
contracts-that our willingness to take responsibility for peace and security
makes it easier for others to shirk theirs. 55
In the one clear challenge to US sanctions under the GATT, the United
States was successful in excluding the "national security" character of the 1985
51
52

53

54

55

Id at Annex on Financial Services § 2(a).
Compare, for example, GATT art XX (excepting from GATT requirements measures
undertaken for morals, life or health, precious metals, compliance with certain regulatory
laws, products of prison labor, national treasures or patrimony, conservation, certain
commodity agreements, world-price adjustment, and short-supply materials) with GATS art
XI (excepting from GATS requirements measures undertaken for morals or public order, life
or health, compliance with certain regulatory laws, and taxation) (cited in note 30) (cited in
note 44).
Compare GATT art XXI, § (b) (cited in note 30) (providing exceptions from GATT
obligations with respect to any measure undertaken that a member "considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests") with GATS art XIV bis 5 1 (providing
exceptions from GATS obligations with respect to any measure undertaken that a member
"considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests"). But compare
GATS art XIV bis § 2 (requiring reporting of certain excepted measures and of their
termination to WTO Council for Trade in Services).
See, for example, Dattu and Boscariol, 28 Can Bus L J at 198 (cited in note 30); Walker, 3
DePaul Dig Ind L at 1 (cited in note 16); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidari (libertad)Act: Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 Am J Intl L 419
(1996).
Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the WITO Challenge:Making a Casefor the United
States under the GATT National Security Exception, 11 Fla J Intl L 559, 574 (1997), quoting
William Drozdiak, US Pushes NATO on Arms Prolieralion,Wash Post Al (Dec 17, 1997).
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Nicaragua embargo from challenge before an Article XXIII panel.5 6
Nevertheless, commentators have 'argued that Article XXI(b) has never been
explicitly relied upon to except imposition of extraterritorial sanctions against
secondary targets, as is the case under the Helms-Burton Act or the ILSA. 7
There are two possible responses to this argument. First, one could respond
that, on the merits, sanctions against secondary targets are "entirely consistent"
with the GATT and other US commitments under the WTO, since "the United
States reserved the right to protect its security interests."" Second, as a textual
matter, the national security exception does not appear to differentiate between
primary and secondary targets, but focuses rather upon the sanctioning state's
declared motivation in imposing sanctions.5 9
A separate problem is the factual question of whether or not a national
security rationale can remain credible over an extended period of time, as in the
case of the forty-year Cuban embargo.60 However, given the explicit
continuation of these emergency authorities by presidential determination from
year to year,61 analytically this situation would seem to be indistinguishable from
a fresh declaration of an emergency for purposes of GATT Article XXI (b)(iii).
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Contracting Parties on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATFAtivities 1986 at 5859 (1987) (noting that GATT panel examining complaint by Nicaragua concerning US
embargo not authorized to examine US invocation of GATT Article XXI).
See, for example, Dattu and Boscariol, 28 Can Bus LJ at 209 (cited in note 30).
Richard W. Stevenson, Canada, Backed by Mexico, Protests to U.S. on Cuba Sanctions, NY Times
A7 (Mar 14, 1996) (quoting remarks by former US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor).
See GATT art XXI, § (b)(iii):
Nothing in [the GATT] shall be construed
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessayfor the protectionof its essentialsecurity interests

60

(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations...
(emphasis added). The only appreciable substantive limitation on this exception would seem
to be that it is not intended to apply to actions taken "under the guise of security ...which
really have a commercial purpose." UN Doc No EPCT/A/PV/33 at 20-21 and Corr 3,
cited in GA7T, Analytical Index. Guide to GATT Law and Practice 600 (WTO 1995) (quoting
remarks by one drafter of original GATT text). See Dattu and Boscariol, 28 Can Bus LJ at
204 (cited in note 30) (discussing remarks); Alexander, 11 Fla J Ind L at 576-77 (cited in note
55) (discussing implications of remarks). In addition, a 1982 Decision of the GATT
Contracting Parties required that contracting parties (in other words, "member states") taking
measures under Article XXI notify other contracting parties. Decision concerning Article XXI of
the GeneralAgreement, L/5426 GATT BISD (29th Supp) at 23-24 (1983).
See, for example, Alexander, 11 Fla J Intl L at 571-72 (cited in note 55) (noting fading

61

credibility of national security rationale for Cuban embargo, and emergence of new rationales
after enactment of Helms-Burton Act).
See Pres Determination No 02-31, 67 Fed Reg 58681 (2002) (continuing exercise of
emergency authorities under Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 USC app § 5(b) note (2000),
for one year, including Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR § 515).

Vol. 4 No. 2

O06 est votre chapeau? Economic Sanctions and Trade Regulation

Mall

If that is the case, then the self-judging application of the national security
exception remains a formidable bar to WTO review of the merits of these
unilateral sanctions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Given the breadth and flexibility of the self-judging national security
exception, it would seem to be a difficult project to argue successfully to a WTO
panel that US economic sanctions are impermissible under the GATT.Yet, in
the case of other GATT exceptions-the general exceptions of GATT Article
XX-the applicability of an exception is moderated by the scope limitations of
the chapeau of Article XX itself.62 Exceptions are "[s]ubject to the requirement
that [member state] measures are not applied in a manner which constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries .. .or a
disguised restriction on international trade."63 Thus, action "provisionally
justified" under an exception may nevertheless constitute an abuse or misuse of
the exception "in the light of the chapeau of Article XX',' 6 4 This approach to the
interpretation of provisions of the GATT-and specifically of the general
exceptions of Article XX-is a well-established principle in GATT practice. In
effect, many of the criticisms raised against the WTO-consistency of US
economic sanctions implicitly reflect this principle; in other words, US
invocation of the national security exception constitutes an abuse or misuse of
the exception. The problem, however, is that there is no chapeau in the text of
Article XXI and its national security exception. In context, then, the national
security exception should be read in a manner faithful to its own terms.
Assuming, as we must, that the self-judging exception is to be applied as
invoked by a sanctioning state,65 we need not conclude that member states that
are affected as primary or secondary targets of US sanctions are without redress
under the WTO system. It remains open for an applicant before a WTO panel
to argue that US sanctions nullify or impair reasonable expectations of benefits
under the GATT or other WTO undertakings, "whether or not [the sanctions]

62

The term chapeau refers to the opening or introductory text of a provision that then breaks
out separately identified subheadings or provisions. See, for example, World Trade
Organization, Report of the Panel, UnitedStates-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 at
7.27, WTO Doc No WT/DS152/R (Dec 22, 1999) (discussing significance of chapeau)
(hereinafter Trade Act Report).

63

GATT art XX (cited in note 30).

64

Trade Act Report 7.27, citing World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body
160, 186, WTO Doc
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
No WT/DS58/AB/RW (Nov 6, 1998).
But compare note 59 (suggesting that exception is not available for situation of disguised

65

commercial advantage).
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conflict[ ] with the provisions of [the GATT]." 66 It is by no means unreasonable
to anticipate that "a panel might come to the conclusion that the reasonable
expectations as to their trade opportunities both with the target country and
with the country taking [the secondary] boycott action have been disappointed
and that compensation should be granted in such a situation. ' 67 In this regard it
is important to note that the national security exception of GATT Article XXI
does not provide immuniy for a sanctioning member state, but is only a rule of
construction barring other states from construing the GATT to prevent the
sanctioning state from taking action in "protection of its essential security
interests. ,,68 Ultimately, the reconciliation of unilateral sanctions authority and
the reasonable expectations of the WTO system may occur in redressing the
nullification or impairment of benefits of a target state, by authorizing it to
withhold concessions from a sanctioning state. In effect, the target state can take
its chapeau and go home.

66

67
68

GATT art XXI1J § 1(b) (cited in note 30). For explication of the "nullification or
impairment" argument, see Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement Annex 2 art 26, 5 1 (hereinafter DSU) (providing
for "non-violation complaints" pursuant to GATT Article XXIII, § 1(b). See generally Dattu
and Boscariol, 28 Can Bus L J at 208 (cited in note 30) (so arguing); Alexander, 11 Fla J Intl
L at 578-79 (cited in note 55) (discussing possible non-violation complaint with respect to
secondary targets).
Ambassador Hugo Paeman, Head of the Delegation of the European Comission, Remarks at
American Society of International Law (Mar 27, 1996), in 90 Proc Am Soc Intl L 3, 7 (1996).
GATT art XXI, § (b) (cited in note 30). Akande and Williams capture this distinction
succinctly when they distinguish, for purposes of WTO dispute resolution under the DSU,
between "the jurisdiction of the panel to consider a complaint raising issues of national
security and .. . the justiciability of the validity or legality of any invocation of national
security considerations." Akande and Williams, InternationalAdjudication on National Securiy
lssuoes, 43 VaJ Intl L at 379 (cited in note 30).
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